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Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus,
Dames en Heren, Ladies and Gentlemen,
On this occasion I would like to address you on the Development 
Agenda for the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and 
the role of intellectual property rights (IPR) in fostering innovation and 
technology transfer. More in particular, the mounting pressure from 
developing nations to view intellectual property not just as a means to 
guarantee the interests of rightholders, but also to bring about economic 
development and welfare for the whole of global society. A balance of 
interest between IPR and the public domain features high on the agenda 
of new international initiatives aiming to harmonize and streamline IPR 
and procedures. Public interest concerns and a development dimension are 
key features in the search for this balance. This is why there is mounting 
pressure to make current discussions on a draft Substantive Patent Law 
Treaty (SPLT) and also the existing intellectual property framework subject 
to a so-called “Development Agenda for WIPO”. This Development Agenda 
aims to bridge the gap that separates wealthy nations from the poor. 
In the fall of 2004 Argentina and Brazil submitted a formal proposal 
to the WIPO relating to the establishment of a new development agenda 
within WIPO.1 The proposal addresses the “knowledge gap” and “digital 
divide” that separates wealthy nations from developing nations and calls 
for a case-by-case assessment of the role of intellectual property and its 
impact on development. Whereas in the previous years the prevailing 
trend has been to harmonise international legal norms through the 
World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement), there is now a clear call for 
increased flexibility.
This flexibility should not only be exercised in respect of the 
existing obligations and their permitted limitations under the TRIPS 
Agreement, but should also prompt WIPO to act in consistence with 
the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals.2 In this respect 
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1.  WO/GA/31/11 of August 27, 2004.
2.  See www.developmentgoals.org/. The goals are: 1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hun-
ger, 2) Achieve universal primary education, 3) Promote gender equality and empower 
women, 4) Reduce child moralist, 5) Improve maternal health, 6) Combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, and other diseases, 7) Ensure environmental sustainability, 8) Develop a global 
partnership for development.
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the development agenda places special emphasis on Articles 7 and 8 of 
the TRIPS Agreement. These provisions deal with the objectives of the 
TRIPS Agreement and point to the need for the international transfer 
of technology and to the promotion of public policy objectives of socio-
economic and technological development. It is the aim of the WIPO 
Development Agenda to make sure that all future WIPO initiatives 
reflect these TRIPS objectives: 
First, these provisions place the protection of intellectual property 
rights in the context of a balance of rights and obligations of producers 
and users of technical knowledge. This places a special emphasis 
on the promotion of technological innovation and the transfer and 
dissemination of technology in a manner beneficial to social economic 
welfare. 
Second, these provisions recognise that WTO Members are entitled 
to a certain degree of flexibility when it comes to the protection of 
public health and nutrition, and the promotion of public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development. 
Third, the provisions recognise that members may take appropriate 
measures to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights or 
practices that restrain trade or adversely affect technology transfer.
Plan
In the speech that follows, I will introduce to you the content of 
the Development Agenda and the role and place of the WIPO and 
the WTO in international standard setting for intellectual property. 
In this light I will discuss the flexibilities that developing countries 
are seeking in implementing and interpreting the TRIPS Agreement. 
This so-called “rational and humane policy” should serve to meet the 
needs of developing nations when it comes to public and health policy, 
innovation and technology transfer. By means of examples involving 
compulsory licensing for essential drugs and recent enhancements of 
the copyright system, I will show that the Western world is undermining 
the Development Agenda by introducing so-called TRIPS-plus obligations 
through the WTO system and bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).3
In conclusion I will provide examples how, for the purpose of 
3.  See www.bilaterals.org.
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furthering investment in innovation and technology transfer to the 
benefit of developing countries, use is made of the existing IPR 
framework and how minor amendments could even yield more results.
The Development Agenda
The Development Agenda is about finding flexibility in the 
implementation of TRIPS obligations but also about balancing the 
monopoly of the intellectual property rightholder with the interests of 
third parties and of society as a whole. Flexibility is, however, something 
that sits uneasy with the current trend in intellectual property policy. 
This trend has been one of maximalization of rights to stamp out piracy 
and one of harmonization to provide a one-size fits all level playing 
field of rights. Flexibility to curb the full exercise of the intellectual 
property monopoly to accommodate the interests of users, competitors 
or developing countries is not popular among industrialists. In a 
recent interview Bill Gates even went so far as to say that restricting 
intellectual property rights is tantamount to communism:
“... [O]f the world’s economies, there’s more that believe in intellectual 
property today than ever. There are fewer communists in the world today 
than there were. There are some new modern-day sort of communists 
who want to get rid of the incentive for musicians and moviemakers 
and software makers under various guises. They don’t think that those 
incentives should exist.
 
And this debate will always be there. I’d be the first to say that the 
patent system can always be tuned -- including the US patent system. 
There are some goals to cap some reform elements. But the idea that the 
United States has led in creating companies, creating jobs, because we’ve 
had the best intellectual-property system -- there’s no doubt about that 
in my mind, and when people say they want to be the most competitive 
economy, they’ve got to have the incentive system. Intellectual property 
is the incentive system for the products of the future.” (Bill Gates, January 
2005)4
4.  Gates, ‘Restricting IP rights is tantamount to communism’, interview with Kanellos, 
CNET News.com, January 06, 2005, available at insight.zdnet.co.uk/software/win-
dows/0,39020478,39183197,00.htm.
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This statement is testament to the idea that stronger IPR 
automatically lead to more innovation and that one uniform -read US- 
system of rights is superior.
A recent World Bank publication on Intellectual Property and 
Development,5 however, shows that neither strong IPR, nor bilateral 
investment or free trade agreements automatically yield an increase 
in technology transfer and foreign direct investment (FDI).6 Figures 
show that countries with weak protection or enforcement of IPR like 
Brazil and China have been more successful in attracting FDI than 
many developing countries that have made strong IPR central to their 
development strategy.7 Brazil and China are high growth, large market 
economies with an increasingly adequate regulatory system involving 
taxes, investment regulations, production incentives, trade policies 
and even a hint of competition rules. The strength of IPR protection 
is clearly not the only factor in investment decision making. Empirical 
economic studies show that the relationship between IPR and FDI in 
developing countries varies highly in respect of industry type, the stage 
of economic development and the natural and labour resources of the 
country in question. Econometric evidence of positive effects of strong 
IPR on FDI and technology transfer is not conclusive.8 Strengthening 
IPR is therefore mostly seen as a signal indicating that a country is 
willing to provide a more business-friendly environment. It is clear that 
IPR protection should not be detrimental to follow-on investors and 
creators. This requires careful definitions on the scope of protection 
provided by IPR, sensible fair use exceptions that allow certain uses 
related to teaching, research and private use of protected materials and 
a balanced compulsory licensing regime, making essential patents and 
protected works available to competitors and follow-on creators against 
reasonable royalty rates.
5.  Fink/Maskus (eds.), Intellectual Property and Development - Lessons form Recent 
Economic Research (2005, New York, World Bank/Oxford University Press). See also 
Braga/Fink/Sepulveda, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, World 
Bank Discussion Paper No. 412 (2000, Washington, World Bank).
6.  Correa, Bilateral investment agreements: Agents of new global standards for the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights? (2004, GRAIN) at 3, available at www.grain.org.
7.   Maskus, ‘The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct 
Investment and Technology Transfer’, note 5 at 54, where examples cited comprise Sub-
Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe.
8.  Ibid. at 63-66.
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So far the likes of Bill Gates have been extremely successful in getting 
their point across. The protection of databases, the legal recognition 
of digital rights management that limit fair use,9 the protection of 
gene sequences for the purpose of diagnostic testing, the patenting of 
business methods and software are but a few examples of new standard 
setting that may lead to the de facto protection of ideas and facts, as 
opposed to the protection of innovation and original expression. 
Prior to this, the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement10 had already 
strengthened the position of intellectual property rightholders by obliging 
Members to the WTO to adopt minimum standards for protection and 
provide effective enforcement measures. Since its adoption in 1994 the 
TRIPS Agreement has become the de facto norm that shapes multilateral, 
regional, bilateral and national intellectual property laws and practices. It 
is the basis for all current and future standard setting in the area of IPR.
Further development of IPR protection based on TRIPS Agreement 
obligations is controversial. A combination of multilateral and bilateral 
agreements is widening the scope of IPR even more. These BITs or 
FTAs permit developed countries to use their considerable economic 
leverage comprising FDI or market access to influence the domestic 
economy of developing countries. When IPR provisions are included, 
these agreements are referred to as TRIPS-plus agreements and they 
can have serious adverse effects on the public interests in developing 
countries. 
An authoritative UK Government Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights has noted that introducing higher standards of protection and 
enforcement of IPR already put a considerable strain on the resources 
and economies of developing countries.11 Further increases could have a 
9.  Klein/Lerner/Murphy, ‘The Economics of Copyright “Fair Use” in a Networked World’, 
American Economic Review, May 2002 (Papers and Proceedings), 92(2), pp. 205-8.
10.  The TRIPS Agreement was adopted as part of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round of 
Trade Negotiations in 1994. See www.wto.org for the full text of the Agreement.
11.  Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights 
and Development Policy (2002, London, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights). 
Bilateral agreements entered into between the EC and their Member States and various 
partners require these partners to ensure adequate and effective protection of intel-
lectual property rights “in conformity with the highest international standards”, see 
Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting 
14-18 (2002), study prepared for the UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, all 
available at www.iprcommission.org.
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negative impact on agriculture, education, public health, innovation and 
technology transfer and commonly raise the cost of administration and 
enforcement for developing nations.
Still, TRIPS-plus standards are now a permanent fixture in international 
trade, as they are integral to many bilateral trade and investment 
agreements.12 Furthermore, WIPO’s efforts to develop and promote 
IPR have more TRIPS-plus overtones than mere TRIPS implementation 
assistance would require.13
From its inception in 1970 and subsequent status as an agency of 
the United Nations system of international organisations, WIPO has 
played a central role in the administration of intellectual property 
Unions and the promotion of the protection of intellectual property14 
and currently has 179 members. The arrival in 1994 of WTO as the new 
kid on the block has prompted WIPO to reassess its role. Gone was 
the possibility for members to pick and choose intellectual property 
regimes and enforcement standards that the WIPO had on offer. Gone 
was the possibility of membership without effective enforcement. The 
TRIPS Agreement galvanised both minimum norms of protection and 
enforcement. WIPO was in danger of becoming sidelined. 
To provide a basis for a sensible division of tasks and competences, 
a cooperation Agreement was reached with the WTO in 1995. Under it, 
WIPO now also provides technical assistance for TRIPS implementation 
to developing country members of the WTO. Providing assistance is 
after all one of the areas in which WIPO is specialised. In many ways 
this has become a lifeline for WIPO, which is now able assist the WTO 
by offering expertise in the area of intellectual property law so as to 
ensure a successful implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. It also 
enables WIPO to continue to be engaged in the spread of its own 
WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties and the 
further development of new intellectual property initiatives, being most 
notably the overhaul of the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the before-
mentioned inception of a Substantive Patent Law Convention.
12.  Vivas-Eugui, Regional and Bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-plus World: the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA), TRIPS Issues Papers No 1 (2003 QUNO/QIAP/ICTSD, 
Geneva).
13.  Musungu/Dutfield, Multilateral Agreements and TRIPS-plus World: The World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO) (2003, QUNO/QIAP/ICTSD, Geneva).
14.  Vide Art. 3 and 4 of the WIPO Convention.
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Yet this newfound role of WIPO as the ambassador of the TRIPS 
Agreement has also made WIPO more vulnerable to criticism over all 
activities that they undertake in respect of furthering the acceptance 
and development of IPR. It is against this backdrop that international 
standard setting leads to international trade disputes. 
All these developments have prompted a debate on the negative 
impact that raised IPR and TRIPS-plus agreements may have for 
developing countries. The issues are too numerous to cover within the 
scope of this lecture, but it suffices to say that TRIPS-plus will stretch the 
scarce resources of developing nations even further. I will just mention 
the issue of protection of Geographical Indications for wines and spirits, 
and other agricultural products or handicraft items,15 the protection 
of traditional knowledge and folklore,16 establishing collecting rights 
societies in developing countries,17 protection of plant varieties and 
biodiversity,18 and the patenting of biological material.19
I will therefore confine myself to two detailed examples illustrating 
15.  Heath, ‘Geographical Indications: International, Bilateral and Regional Agreements’; 
Kamperman Sanders, ‘Future Solutions for Protecting Geographical Indications 
Worldwide’; and Corte-Real, ‘The Conflict Between Trade Marks and Geographical 
Indications - The Budweiser Case in Portugal’, all in Heath/Kamperman Sanders (eds.), 
New Frontiers of Intellectual Property (2005, Oxford/Portland, Hart).
16.  Bachner, ‘Back to the Future: Intellectual Property Rights and the Modernisation of 
Traditional Chinese Medicine’; Antons, ‘Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property 
Rights in Australia and Southeast Asia’; Gray, ‘Maori Culture and Trade Mark Law in New 
Zealand’, all in Heath/Kamperman Sanders (eds.), New Frontiers of Intellectual Property 
(2005, Oxford/Portland, Hart).
17.  Schlatter, ‘Copyright Collecting Societies in Developing Countries: Possibilities and 
Dangers’, in Heath/Kamperman Sanders (eds.), New Frontiers of Intellectual Property 
(2005, Oxford/Portland, Hart).
18.  Heath, ‘Plant Varieties, Biodiversity and Access Rights’; Mo, ‘Protection of Plant Varieties 
in Greater China’; Donavanik, ‘Plant Varieties and Access Rights in Asia and the South’, 
all in Heath/Kamperman Sanders (eds.), Industrial Property in the Bio-Medical Age (2003, 
The Hague/London/New York, Kluwer Law International).
19.  Llewelyn, ‘Perspectives on Patenting Biological Material’, Sherman, ‘Biological Inventions 
and the Problem of Passive Infringement’, all in Heath/Kamperman Sanders (eds.), 
Industrial Property in the Bio-Medical Age (2003, The Hague/London/New York, Kluwer 
Law International); Hubicki/Sherman, ‘Terminator Genes as “Technical” Protection 
Measures for Patents?’, in Heath/Kamperman Sanders (eds.), New Frontiers of Intellectual 
Property (2005, Oxford/Portland, Hart).
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the Development Agenda’s concerns. First, the contentious issue of 
access to essential medicine by means of compulsory licensing, which 
still is a cornerstone of the WIPO Development Agenda.
Second, the issue of how raised standards on copyright may 
negatively affect follow-on investment and creativity in downstream 
markets. This demonstrates that there is a more fundamental problem 
in international standard setting, namely that of raising IPR levels of 
protection, while omitting to also to address the issue of user rights and 
competition concerns.
Access to essential medicine
Compulsory licensing of patented pharmaceuticals has been a hot 
topic for quite some time.20 Most notably the issue of providing access 
for the poor to drugs to combat AIDS made headlines in the global 
media and was subject of intense lobbying at the WTO. Governments 
of South Africa and Brazil, and major drugs companies together with 
industrialized nations found one another on opposite sides of the 
fence. If anything, the media coverage has also made the general public 
aware that drugs companies prefer to target the tourists rather than 
the developing nations they visit in increasingly greater numbers when 
it comes to making available much-needed medication for diseases 
such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV. These three diseases alone kill 
5 million people every year.21  Although less than 5% of the drugs on the 
World Health Organization (WHO) Essential Drugs List22 are patented23 
20.  See also Kamperman Sanders, ‘Patents - Antitrust, Compulsory Licensing and Research 
Exceptions’, in Heath/Kamperman Sanders (eds.), Industrial Property in the Bio-Medical 
Age (Kluwer Law International, 2003), 163-84; and ‘Compulsory Licensing and Public 
Health’, 11 MJ 4 (2004) 337-46.
21.  See AIDS Epidemic Update December 2004, UNAIDS/04.45E (2004, UNAIDS/WHO), avail-
able at www.unaids.org.
22.  See www.who.int/medicines/organization/par/edl/procedures.shtml for the selection 
criteria of essential medicines, which do not include the patent status of the drug in 
question, but does give consideration to cost, thus potentially excluding therapeutically 
important, but expensive drugs, and for the list see mednet3.who.int/eml/eml_intro.
asp; See also Velásquez, ‘Phamaceutical Patents and Accessibility to Drugs’, Revue 
Internationale de Droit Economique Special Edition: Pharmaceutical Patents, Innovations 
and Public Health (2001), 41 and Dumoulin, ‘Patents and the Price of Drugs’, Revue 
Internationale de Droit Economique Special Edition: Pharmaceutical Patents, Innovations 
and Public Health (2001), 49.
23. IFPMA Press Release, Geneva, 20 December 2001, available at www.ifpma.org.
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and patent protection in many developing countries is less stringent 
than TRIPS otherwise requires,24 the drugs are still not available. It 
is estimated that 2 billion people cannot get adequate treatment.25 
Lack of distribution channels and high cost of drugs relative to the 
gross domestic product (GDP) and average wage make up half of the 
explanation why this is so. When it comes to the availability of the 
latest, more effective, or complex drugs, patent rights and the lack of 
production facilities make up the other half. Increasingly traditional 
producers and suppliers of cheap generic drugs such as India, the world’s 
leading supplier of generic medicines,26 have been under pressure27 
to adopt TRIPS compliant patent acts that protect pharmaceutical 
products, processes, and products directly obtained by use of this 
patented process.28 India is also a nation where as high as one in seven 
people may be infected with HIV.29 A recently adopted30 Indian patent 
act will provide heightened protection to medicines invented after the 
implementation date, but also those that have been patented outside 
of India since January 1, 1995. According to TRIPS31 India was required to 
establish a “mailbox” when it became a member of the WTO. Foreign 
applicants could already file patents between 1995 and 2005 for later 
consideration. There are some 4,000 patent applications for medicines 
that are now waiting to be examined by the Indian Patent Office. 
24. The Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health of 14 November 2001 
(WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2) reiterates that the least developed members are exempted from 
implementing, employing and enforcing pharmaceutical product and test data protec-
tion and may refrain from granting exclusive marketing protection during the period 
patent protection is not provided until 1 January 2016, see www.wto.org.
25.  See www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/medecine/index_en.htm.
26.  66,7% of India’s drug exports go to developing countries.
27.  See report of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body Panel on India - Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS79/R of 24 August 1998.
28.  Patents Bill (Bill No. 32-C of 2005), of which TRIPS compliance is still an issue.
29.  On the contentious issue whether India is the most HIV-dense country see www.the-
globalfund.org and HIV is “out of control” in India’, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_
asia/4461999.stm and ‘India rejects HIV infection claim’, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
south_asia/4463899.stm See also Médecins Sans Frontières www.msf.org/countries 
India.
30.  The bill was passed by the Indian parliament in March 2005.
31.  Art. 70(8).
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Patents eventually granted may affect generics currently available on 
the market, unless they are made subject to a compulsory licence.
Compulsory Licensing and the Flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement
The TRIPS Agreement offers WTO members a broad discretion on 
government use of compulsory licensing. There are no limitations on 
the grounds upon which a government can authorize use of a patent 
by third parties. Grounds explicitly mentioned in Art. 31 TRIPS are: 
national emergency, anti-competitive practices, public non-commercial 
use and dependent patents. Further grounds can be found in Art. 
8(1), which allows members to adopt measures necessary to protect 
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development. Furthermore Art. 8(2) permits members to take necessary 
measures to prevent the abuse of IPR by right holders and practices 
that unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international 
transfer of technology. There are, however, a number of procedural 
requirements that can be summarized as follows: 
1.  Cases have to be judged on their individual merits, thus excluding 
blanket advance approval for patents in a particular field of 
technology;32
2.  Prior to authorizing third party use there should be an effort to 
negotiate a voluntary licence on reasonable commercial terms;
3.  Government must provide for adequate remuneration, taking into 
account the economic value of the authorization; and
4.  Use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market;
5.  The scope and duration of the licence is limited to the purpose for 
which it was authorized, a requirement which is supplemented by 
the ‘Intel clause’, limiting the compulsory licensing of semiconductor 
technology to public non-commercial use and judicial remedies for 
anti-competitive behaviour;
6.  Licences must be terminated if and when the circumstances, which 
led to it, cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.
32. Further reinforced by Art. 27(1), which states that patents shall be available and patent 
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technol-
ogy and whether products are imported or locally produced.
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Exemptions can be found in Art. 31(b), which allows a waiver of the 
requirements for negotiation for a voluntary licence on reasonable 
commercial terms in case of 
1.  A national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency; 
or 
2. In cases of public non-commercial use.
In short, the TRIPS rules on compulsory licensing seemingly already 
offer the necessary flexibility that proponents of the WIPO Development 
Agenda seek.
However, nations, most notably Brazil and South Africa, trying to use 
this flexibility for the purpose of supplying generic anti-retroviral AIDS 
drugs produced under (threat of) compulsory licences, found that their 
interpretation of this scope of the flexibility that TRIPS offers differs 
from western notions for fair licensing.
The United States in particular were quick to point to the general 
nature of the compulsory licensing provisions in the patent statutes of 
these countries and in 2001 took action against Brazil before the WTO.33 
The USA complained:
‘Brazil has asserted that the U.S. case will threaten Brazil’s widely-praised 
anti-AIDS program, and will prevent Brazil from addressing its national 
health crisis. Nothing could be further from the truth. For example, should 
Brazil choose to compulsory licence anti-retroviral AIDS drugs, it could 
do so under Section 71 of its patent law, which authorises compulsory 
licensing to address a national health emergency, consistent with TRIPS, 
and which the United States is not challenging. In contrast, Section 68 
- the provision under dispute - may require the compulsory licensing of 
33.  On 1 February 2001, a WTO panel was established to hear the case (WT/DS199/1). The 
U.S. position was that the compulsory licensing provision for non-working is in violation 
of Art. 27(1) TRIPS, which prohibits Members of the WTO from requiring the local produc-
tion of the patented invention as a condition for enjoying exclusive patent rights. The 
United States asserted that the “local working” requirement contained in the Brazilian 
Patent Act can only be satisfied by the local production - and not the importation - of 
the patented subject-matter. This position is fuelled by the impression that working of 
the patent needs to take place in the territory of Brazil.  Furthermore, the U.S. takes issue 
with the fact that failure to work the patent also comprises incomplete manufacture of 
the product or a failure to make full use of the patented process.
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any patented product, from bicycles to automobile components to golf 
clubs. Section 68 is unrelated to health or access to drugs, but instead is 
discriminating against all imported products in favour of locally produced 
products. In short, Section 68 is a protectionist measure intended to create 
jobs for Brazilian nationals.’34
In the ensuing public relations battle Brazil put itself ahead of the 
game in that it capitalized on the AIDS drugs patent dispute in South 
Africa35 and brought its successful national STD/AIDS programme to 
the attention of the world.36 Brazil even managed to get a resolution 
adopted by the UN Commission of Human Rights on the right of access 
to medication.37 The 53-member body passed the resolution by a 52-0 
vote, with the United States abstaining.
At the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference of November 2001 in 
Quatar, consensus on the compulsory licensing issue was seen as 
imperative for the successful conclusion of a new round of world trade 
negotiations.38 Ironically the Anthrax crisis in the USA and the reaction 
of the US government in face of this national emergency to obtain the 
34.  U.S. Special 301 report, 2001, www.ustr.gov/enforcement/special.pdf on the dispute 
before the WTO with Brazil.
35. See Seeman ‘Patently Wrong’, National Review, 21 March 2001, www.nationalreview.
com/nr_comment/nr_commentprint032101a.html; Mutetwa, ‘HIV/AIDS: is Zimbabe 
doing enough?’, Financial Gazette 26 April 2001, www.fingaz.co.zw/fingaz/2001/April/
April 26/1429.shtml, Reuters, ‘Cuba Backs Brazil in AIDS Drugs Patent Dispute’, 3 April 
2001, and ‘Cuba Seeks Third World Challenge to Patent Rules’, news.findlaw.com/legal-
news/s/20010323/cubausapatents.html.
36. See Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights 
and Development Policy (2002, London, CIPRs) at 43, available at www.iprcommission.
org.
37. See the resolution adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
Res/2000/7. See also UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution, Access to medication 
in the context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/33, of 23 April 
2001, which was proposed by Brazil. Available at www.unhchr.ch/.
38. Moore, former director-general of the WTO, indicated in a statement that ‘resolving the 
TRIPS and public health issue might be the ‘deal-breaker’ for a new trade round’, see 
Banta, ‘Public Health Triumphs at WTO Conference’, 286 Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 2655 (2001), 2656, available at jama.ama-assn.org/issues/v286n21/fpdf/
jmn1205.pdf.
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drug CIPRO at the lowest price possible was a godsend for developing 
countries. They felt empowered to push within the WTO for a deal on 
compulsory licensing.
Due to the continuing media exposure of the lack of availability of 
antiretroviral AIDS drugs for the poor, of the fact that profit margins 
for Big Pharma are the highest of any industry,39 and of the Anthrax 
crisis in the USA40 a breakthrough was possible in the post 9/11 world. 
The result was a joint declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health.41 The Ministerial Declaration amounts to an understanding 
that members will not bring action under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding over compulsory licensing of essential patented drugs.42 
It also reiterates that the least developed country Members43 will not be 
obliged, in respect to pharmaceutical products, to implement the patent 
section44 or to enforce rights provided for under these sections before 1 
January 2016, thus alleviating any pressure on the compulsory licensing 
issue.45 The Ministerial Declaration hinges on the interpretation of TRIPS 
39.  In terms of profit ranked by percentage return on revenues, pharmaceuticals rank first 
at over 18%. By means of comparison, commercial banks achieve rates of 14%, mining 
and crude oil production 9%, household and personal products 8%, and insurance and 
securities 7%. See 362 New Internationalist (2003), available at www.newint.org.
40.  See ‘Double Standards’, Nature, 1 November 2001, vol. 4141 at 1: ‘The Bush administra-
tion ... proceeded to extract agreement from Bayer to supply the drug at one-fifth of its 
previous price. The health secretary, Tommy Thompson, even boasted that the threat of 
compulsory licensing had helped to clinch the deal.’
41. Adopted on 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 20 November 2001. 
42. Vandoren, ‘Médicaments sans Frontières? Clarification of the Relationship between 
TRIPS and Public Health resulting from the WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration’, 5 Journal 
of World Intellectual Property (2002); and Abbott, ‘The TRIPS Agreement, Access to 
Medicines, and the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference’, 5 Journal of World Intellectual 
Property (2002).
43. For a list of least developed countries see www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?do
cid=2929&intItemID=1634&lang=1.
44. Section 5 TRIPS Agreement.
45. On the issue of the role of the patent system as a motivator or hindrance to innovation 
in the pharmaceutical area see Muennich, ‘Pharmaceutical Patents and Availability of 
Drugs’, Revue Internationale de Droit Economique Special Edition: Pharmaceutical Patents, 
Innovations and Public Health 73 (2001) and Mossinghoff, ‘The Importance of Intellectual 
Property Protection to the American Research-Intensive Pharmaceutical Industry’, 31 
Columbia Journal of World Business 38 (1996).
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Article 8(1) and its exception for the institution of measures necessary46 
to protect public health that are consistent with the TRIPS provisions.47 
In the face of adversity (the U.S. and Big Pharma tried to limit the scope 
of the Declaration to drugs for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria) the WTO members took some two years to agree on 
measures that would lead to a satisfactory arrangement to give effect 
to the Declaration. The supply of essential drugs under compulsory 
licences to least-developed WTO members and WTO members with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector 
was finally guaranteed in the WTO General Council Decision of 30 
August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Declaration 
of the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.48 The Decision will see the 
WTO begin to routinely review the issuance of individual licences for 
pharmaceutical products and it will look at the terms of individual 
licenses. It will evaluate the basis for deciding manufacturing capacity 
is insufficient, or review any of the new terms and obligations for the 
issue of compulsory licences of patents on medicinal products. The 
conditions for a compulsory licence will then also include measures to 
ensure tiered pricing and measures on parallel imports. This means that 
cheap medicine destined for developing nations is not imported back to 
developed nations to be sold at a premium price.
46. See Canada, where stockpiling of drugs in the last six months of patent term was 
permitted. Rogers, ‘The Revised Canadian Patent Act, the Free Trade Agreement, and 
Pharmaceutical Patents: An Overview of Pharmaceutical Compulsory Licensing in 
Canada’, [1990] 10 EIPR 351. See WTO Dispute Settlement Body Panel Report in Canada - 
Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products WT/DS114/R of 25 April 2000. Canada had 
to comply with the DBS’s rulings and recommendations by 12 August 2001, abolishing 
the stockpiling practice.
47. See Art. 27(1) TRIPS, which states that any measures adopted cannot discriminate as to 
the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or 
locally produced; and also Art. XX of GATT 1994, indicating that any measures under 
TRIPS necessary to protect health also cannot amount to ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade’.
48.  WT/L/540 of 2 September 2003.
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We are currently witnessing the first proposals on the implementation 
of the WTO Decision in the EU and Canada.49 These proposals provide 
for a two-pronged approach to the issue of compulsory licensing. First, 
that essential medicine may be produced under compulsory licence 
in the EU and Canada for the purpose of export to WTO members 
with insufficient production capacity. Second, that these drugs are so 
distinctive that customs can easily detect illegal parallel re-importation. 
The EU and Canada seem intent on protecting their own pharmaceutical 
industry base by allowing production of generics in the EU and Canada 
under strict conditions by making use of the WTO system. European and 
Canadian production and control over distribution of drugs will after all 
prevent technology transfer to developing countries.
Data Exclusivity
The USA appears to regard the multilateral trade system with flexible 
standards on compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals as being contrary 
to US interests. It bypasses the WTO system that it was previously a 
major advocate of by entering in bilateral trade agreements. Since the 
establishment of the WTO in 1995, the United States have entered into 
more than 40 BITs and FTAs,50 most which contain a particular US-
style interpretation on appropriate standards for exclusivity of data51 
49.  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on compulsory 
licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export 
to countries with public health problems COM (2004) 737; Similarly see Canadian Bill C-9, 
An Act to amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act (The Jean Chrétien Pledge 
to Africa), 3d sess., 37th Parl., 2004 and the ‘Regulations Amending the Food and Drugs 
Regulations, (1402 - Drugs for Developing Countries’, Canada Gazette Vol. 138, No. 40 
- October 2, 2004, pp. 2748-2760.
50.  Signed US FTAs comprise Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Honduras, Costa Rica, Australia, Morocco, the Dominican Republic and Bahrain. A further 
FTA with the Central American states as a group (CAFTA) is in the process of being rati-
fied by the US Congress.
51. Art. 39(3) TRIPS provides: “Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the 
marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilise new 
chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of 
which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial 
use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where 
necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are 
protected against unfair commercial use.”
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necessary to obtain marketing approval test results for new drugs.52 
In order to obtain marketing authorisation for a pharmaceutical 
product, regulatory standards attesting that the product is clinically 
proven to be safe and effective have to be met. Drugs are therefore 
subject to controlled trials that generate the data necessary to satisfy 
national or regional regulators. Medical trials are expensive and 
require substantial technical skill and expertise. According to the TRIPS 
Agreement, the investment and skill necessary to conduct medical 
trials has to be safeguarded and WTO members have to provide for the 
protection of this data submitted to regulators. Producers of generic 
drugs also have to apply for marketing approval. The usual method of 
obtaining rapid marketing approval is by showing that the generic drug 
is bio-equivalent to the drug that has already been approved and that 
the generic producer is capable of producing the drug at consistent 
quality standards. The test for consistency in production requires the 
generic producer to breach any patent that may still be valid. Whether 
there is an exception for manufacturers of generic drugs to engage 
in clinical trials prior to patent expiry is not harmonised by the TRIPS 
Agreement and standards and procedures vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. The lack of harmonisation in the area of patent licensing 
for the purpose of clinical testing is compounded by the existence of 
data exclusivity, as this may force subsequent applicants for marketing 
approval to generate their own clinical data independently and at 
their own expense. Data exclusivity therefore not only raises the 
cost of the generic product, but serves as a protection mechanism in 
addition to patent protection, since there is limited value in holding a 
compulsory licence if the holder nevertheless has to spend time and 
money generating its own clinical trial data in order to obtain marketing 
approval.53
In most cases, a bilateral agreement with the United States obliges 
the other signatory to provide a period of data exclusivity of between 
five and ten years. A common element is that if medical trial information 
submitted in the first country of marketing approval is relied on 
to obtain marketing approval in another country, the term of data 
52. On data exclusivity see Brazell, ‘A World United? The US Approach to the Protection of 
Regulatory Data’, (2004/2005) 168 Patent World, 23-25.
53. On clinical trials see A. Kamperman Sanders, ‘Patents - Antitrust, Compulsory Licensing 
and Research Exceptions’ in Heath/Kamperman Sanders (eds.), Industrial Property in the 
Bio-Medical Age (2003, The Hague/London/New York, Kluwer Law International).
Inaugural Lecture Dr. Anselm Kamperman Sanders 21
protection of the first country is recognized in the other. Furthermore, 
patent holders are usually to be notified if producers of generic drugs 
attempt to obtain marketing approval prior to patent expiry, enabling 
patent holders to take immediate infringement action should medical 
trials be conducted or production and stockpiling of generics be 
undertaken prior to patent expiry. This turns the regulatory authorities 
that deal with marketing approval for drugs into watchdogs for the 
pharmaceutical industry. Some FTAs even require signatories to provide 
for data exclusivity for all pharmaceutical products, even if these do not 
incorporate new chemical entities.54
What is worrying is that the EU also seems to have picked up on 
the possibility of using the provisions on data exclusivity as a means 
of mitigating the effects of compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals. 
The EU is actively pursuing the issue of data exclusivity within the 
framework of the Cotonou Agreement with African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries.55
The fact that the issue of data exclusivity has not been included in 
the Doha Declaration now appears to be an oversight that is exploited to 
foreclose on the flexibility agreed to in the Doha Declaration. The scope 
for compulsory licensing remains severely limited if data exclusivity 
rules preclude a rapid response to a national emergency. No doubt Big 
Pharma56 is following these developments with glee. With a global 
system of protection of data exclusivity in place they no longer need 
to rely on patents. Government regulators will ensure that suppliers 
of medical trial data retain a de facto market monopoly over the drug 
they have marketed. Government regulators will furthermore give 
Big Pharma early warning of any attempt at producing or marketing 
generic drugs close to patent expiry, so that patent infringement action 
can still be brought in time. The cost for all this extra work for regulators 
will be borne not by Big Pharma, but by nations under the obligation to 
provide data exclusivity.
Let me now turn to my second example, for which we turn to the 
domain of copyright.
54. US-Singapore FTA, Article 16(8) and draft FTAA Section B(2)(j), Art. 1.
55. See the Third World Network Africa website at twnafrica.org/news_detail.
asp?twnID=788.
56. The Big Pharma top 10 list comprises Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, AstraZeneca, 
Johnson & Johnson, Novartis, Bristol-Myers Squib, Pharmacia, and Weyth.
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Incentives for innovation
IPR create a market for inventions, artistic works, or distinctive signs. This 
market enables the rightholder to exercise control over the first sale of an 
industrial or intellectual creation, or a product that embodies or carries this 
creation, so that he is able to reap the rewards of his innovation, creation, 
or marketing effort. IPR also offer the possibility to control the use of the 
protected intellectual asset after the first sale. This form of licensing power 
over downstream markets may be detrimental to welfare,57 because it may 
limit the development of downstream innovation. 
A striking example of this problem is reflected in the discussion on 
the legality of filesharing technology, such as Kazaa, Morpheus, Grokster 
and other non-centralised peer-to-peer networks.58 The US Supreme 
Court is currently considering the legality of filesharing technology in 
the case of MGM v. Grokster.59 The discussion is similar to that on the 
legality of video recorders in the previous century,60 namely whether 
producers of copyright content should be able to control the market of 
the technology used to reproduce and distribute this content even if 
this technology is innovative and also has non-infringing purposes. The 
example from the past concerned the use of the video recorder to view 
recorded TV programmes at a time that better suits our busy lifestyles.61 
57. Boldrin/Levine, ‘The Case Against Intellectual Property’, American Economic Review, May 
2002 (Papers and Proceedings), 92(2), pp. 209-12.
58. See the pending case of MGM v. Grokster, which was heard by the US Supreme Court 
on March 29, 2005. In MGM v. Grokster, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit 
found that P2P file-sharing software is capable of, and is in fact being used for, nonin-
fringing uses. Relying on the Betamax precedent of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the court ruled that the distributors of Grokster and 
Morpheus software cannot be held liable for users’ copyright violations. See also 
Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1031-33.
59. See in this respect also the opposing briefs by numerous law and economic profes-
sors in the Supreme Court case of MGM v. Grokster on behalf of either the respondent 
(Grokster) or the petitioners. All available at www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/.
60. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
61. Upon the introduction of Microsoft’s Media Center software, Bill Gates suggested that 
the technical possibility offered by digital video recorders to automatically remove 
advertising from recorded content is infringing rights of broadcasters and advertisers. 
See his interview for the Hollywood Reporter on the way Microsoft will ensure that we 
will continue to receive advertising at www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr/new_media/
article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000671642.
Inaugural Lecture Dr. Anselm Kamperman Sanders 23
Now it is the use of software to find and disseminate information of 
any description using the least bandwidth and distributed computing 
power.
Increasingly technical protection mechanisms affect what an end-
user can or cannot do in respect of information that has been purchased 
legally, thus limiting previously established user rights, such as making 
copies for private or educational use. In effect these recognised exceptions 
and limitations to copyright are curtailed.62 Current broadband access 
that indeed enables users to conveniently bypass the media industries’ 
old fashioned distribution methods for music and films is predominantly 
available to 117,6 million households in industrialised nations. Although 
large-scale copyright infringement through file sharing networks is 
therefore a problem in the industrialised world, the global copyright 
system has already been tailored to meet the worries of media 
industries by means of the WIPO Copyright and Performances and 
Phonogrammes treaties. These treaties have introduced the right to 
control communication to the public of copyright works and provide 
rightholders with the possibility to act against the removal or alteration 
of digital rights management information, and technical protection 
mechanisms.
Although not part of the WTO TRIPS Agreement, these WIPO treaties 
are fast becoming the de facto world standard, not only because 
countries voluntarily sign up to these agreements, but through inclusion 
in BITs and FTAs. The United States is exporting its version of the WIPO 
treaties, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), not because 
it fulfils the needs of citizens and industry in developing nations, but 
because of economic and political pressure it can exert through BITs 
and FTAs.63
62.  See Gordon, ‘Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors’, 82 Columbia Law Review, 1600-57 (1982), show-
ing that the US Supreme Court decision in the Betamax case that the sale of Betamax 
video recorders did not constitute contributory copyright infringement made perfect 
economic sense because the video recorder has substantial non-infringing uses (like 
time-shifting) that do not adversely affect the market value of the original copyrighted 
work. Licensing control of the film studio’s over the market for video recorders would 
stifle technical innovation.
63. See Correa, note 6 above; Drahos, Expanding Intellectual Property’s Empire: the Role of 
FTAs (2003, GRAIN), both available at www.grain.org.
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Criticism against the unilateral focus on strengthening of rights is 
rife.64 The problem stems from the fact that international copyright 
harmonisation has focussed on the protection of copyright, not 
on establishing common standards on limitations and exceptions. 
National law predominantly determines the scope and number of these 
limitations and exceptions. Limitations and exceptions can be found 
in statute, as is the case in Europe, or in jurisprudence by means of an 
intricate case-by-case fair use analysis, as is the case in the USA. 
The inclusion of IPR in BITs and FTAs means that countries that 
lack access to even the most elementary educational materials are 
confronted with the demand that their copyright statutes are tailored 
to meet the highest western norm. Exceptions and limitations enabling 
fair use of copyright works are, however, not part of that international 
standard setting to the same extent as heightening protection levels are. 
There is little guidance on the appropriate limitations and exceptions, 
let alone special concessions for developing countries, other than the 
WTO-endorsed mantra that the economic interests of rightholders 
should not be harmed.65 The fact that the media industry has long 
been inapt and unwilling66 to replace outdated CD and DVD disc 
technology by adequate internet distribution methods only reinforces 
the feeling that stronger IPR merely serve to preserve the stranglehold 
of western big media industry over new global distribution methods. It 
is not surprising therefore that developing countries feel they have been 
forced to adopt a copyright system that enables multinational media 
conglomerates to maintain a position of global dominance.
Apart from the fact that the United States of America appears to 
be intent on establishing a new status quo outside of multilateral 
WTO framework, the problem with this practice is that the DMCA 
itself is controversial. Many user interest groups in the USA itself, like 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation argue that the unilateral focus on 
64. Boyle, ‘A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property’, 9 Duke Law and 
Technology Review (2004) 1.
65. See the WTO Dispute Settlement Body Panel Report on United States - Section 110(5) 
of the US Copyright Act WT/DS160/R of 15 June 2000, providing interpretation on the 
Berne Three step test dealing with appropriate exemptions to copyright.
66. See Alderman, Sonic Boom - Napster, MP3, and the New Pioneers of Music (2001, 
Cambridge MA, Perseus); Lessing, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the 
Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity (2004, New York, Penguin).
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strengthening IPR leads to the loss of the traditional balance between 
rightholders and users underpinning the intellectual property system. 
They advocate the curbing of IPR by means of enacting stronger user 
rights in relation to copyright, allowing for compulsory licensing for 
essential facilities in the media or medical domains, or simply excluding 
subject matter from patentability. Others simply defend the interest 
of righholders and claim that IPR are full property rights conferring an 
absolute monopoly that should not be subject to limitations harming 
the righholder’s interests. The widely diverging beliefs held by either 
side in this debate can be seen in the briefs submitted to the court in 
support of the media industry or producers of filesharing technology 
in the recent US Supreme Court case in MGM v. Grokster.67 It is clear 
from these statements of support that even law professors, economics 
professors and authors of intellectual property treatises cannot agree 
on appropriate user rights. 
The Development Agenda and IPR policy
The call of the Development Agenda is to come up with a humane 
policy that takes into account the needs of developing nations. The 
recognition of access to medicine as a human right was seen as a 
first step in formulating this humane policy. Yet, the adoption by the 
UN Commission of Human Rights of a declaration on the right of 
access to medicine remains merely symbolic if the IPR system remains 
unclear on the appropriate balance of rights and interests. Rather than 
looking to other or higher legal principles like human rights68 to forge 
humane IPR policy, the IPR system needs to internalise the recognition 
of the interests of all stakeholders. The recognition of interests of 
both developed and developing nations is therefore part of a wider 
concern on the fundamentals of the IPR system. Individual rightholders, 
consumers, citizens and society at large all share a common interest in 
innovation and development of and access to industrial and intellectual 
creativity. WIPO, as the UN’s bureau on the development of IPR, should 
67. See in this respect also the opposing briefs by numerous law and economic profes-
sors in the Supreme Court case of MGM v. Grokster on behalf of either the respondent 
(Grokster) or the petitioners. All available at www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/.
68. Geiger, ‘Fundamental Rights, a Safeguead for the Coherence of Intellectual Propery 
Law?’ 35 (2004) IIC 268; Ostergard, ‘Intellectual Property: A Universal Human Right?’, 21 
Human Rights Quarterly 1 (1999) 156.
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take a leading role in tailoring the IPR system to accommodate the 
needs of all stakeholders.
On 4 October 2004 the WIPO General Assembly agreed to adopt a 
decision to further examine the Development Agenda proposal originally 
presented by Brazil and Argentina (and subsequently sponsored by 
many developing countries) to integrate in a more systematic manner 
the development dimension in all of WIPO’s work. Prior to the General 
Assembly meeting, hundreds of nonprofit organizations, scientists, 
academics and other individuals had signed the “Geneva Declaration 
on the Future of WIPO”69 in support of the Development Agenda’s 
aims to engrain in WIPO’s policies the practice of using IPR as tools 
for the development of nations as opposed to the mere safeguard of 
the interests of individual rightholders. Despite the apparent support 
in the WIPO General Assembly for the Development Agenda no new 
bodies to discuss matters raised in the proposal were created, because 
after all: “WIPO had always been sensitive to the concerns of developing 
countries”. The Development Agenda has not yet died a quiet death, but 
our patient is seriously ill.
An inter-sessional intergovernmental meeting in the Development 
Agenda for WIPO was held on 11 to 13 April 2005. Brazil, now heading 
the “Group of Friends of Development”, comprising Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Peru, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Venezuela raised the stakes in a 
more elaborate proposal on the Development Agenda for WIPO.70 This 
document reads as an indictment of all that is wrong within WIPO. The 
issue that stands out is WIPO’s effort to standardize IPR to the highest 
norm at the expense of least developed and developing nations. The 
document reiterates that WIPO should be driven by a policy recognising 
that:
“Intellectual property should be regarded not as an end in itself, but 
as a means for promoting the public interest, innovation, and access 
to science, technology and the promotion of diverse national creative 
industries  - in order to ensure material progress and welfare in the long 
69. See www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipo.html.
70. Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration of Issues Raised 
in Document WO/GA/31/11, WIPO document IIM/1/4/ of April 6, 2005, available at www.
wipo.int.
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run. Promotion of intellectual property protection alone is not sufficient 
if unaccompanied by policies that respond to the specific development 
needs of each country.”71
A proposal submitted for discussion by the United Kingdom72 
recognises the needs of least developed and developing countries and 
points to the burdens associated with TRIPS implementation on these 
countries. It indicates that there ought to be flexibility to the point of a 
clear opt out for least developed and developing countries to implement 
and reform of their IPR system at a pace in line with their rate of 
development. However, the UK submits that the WTO and not WIPO is 
the appropriate forum to address these complex issues of technology 
transfer.
Even more remarkable, given the fundamental criticism and 
sweeping proposals for change within WIPO that the Group of Friends 
of Development’s paper contain, is the proposal73 from the United 
States of America for the same meeting. It contains little more than a 
proposal for the “WIPO Partnership Program”. This is an internet clearing 
house for development hosted by WIPO, which should bring together 
donors and recipients of IPR development assistance. The rationale for 
the WIPO Partnership Program is to provide more coordinated technical 
assistance in the area of IPR development. Could it be that the United 
States is talking about assistance to further the development of IPR, as 
opposed to IPR and development? I fear this is indeed the case. A follow-
up meeting is planned for June.
Those who have signed the Geneva Declaration on the Future of 
WIPO, and I have seen that many colleagues present today have done 
so, have to rise to the challenge of making sure that the need for a 
Development Agenda for WIPO is not forgotten. The role of academics 
in the field is to teach students and to make policy makers aware of the 
possibilities to redress the balance of the IPR system. Possibilities are 
manifold and there is a lot of work still to be done. 
71. Ibid, p.4.
72. WIPO document IIM/1/5 of April 7, 2005, available at www.wipo.int.
73. WIPO document IIM/1/2 of March 18, 2005, available at www.wipo.int.
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I have four points I would like to raise with you now.
First, governments should be made aware of methods to provide 
equal access to publicly funded research by stipulating that participating 
academic and industry partners commit themselves to an “open source” 
licensing regime. Such a regime should allow partners and third parties 
to make use of and innovate on the basis of the results stemming from 
this research on condition that these original results remain free from 
other IPR.74 In combination with an active policy on technology transfer, 
open source licensing may be a valuable instrument in providing aid, 
especially when used to stimulate FDI in startups and joint ventures in 
developing countries.
Second, policy makers have to be made aware of the fact that 
strengthening and introducing new IPR like data exclusivity can have 
surprising and undesired effects. Unless the current IPR incentive 
structure is changed, access to medicine will continue to be subject 
to trade disputes over patent protection, compulsory licensing, tiered 
pricing, parallel importation and data exclusivity. The current WTO 
General Council Decision on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
aims to provide tiered pricing of pharmaceuticals. This is a first 
effort to discriminate between the sale of highly priced commercial 
pharmaceuticals for the consumer in developed nations and the 
distribution of essential medicine for HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis 
and other tropical diseases to the needy in least developed and 
developing countries. 
It is problematic that R&D spending for pharmaceuticals to combat 
many tropical diseases is not a priority, because the expected return on 
investment is low.
Until Big Pharma is offered real incentives to invest in R&D of drugs 
for the poor75 and is offered a way to recoup the investment in patented 
74. See the European Commission expert group reports on: IPR Aspects of Internet 
Collaborations (2001, EUR 19456); Managing IPR in a Knowledge-based Economy -
Bioinformatics and the Influence of Public Policy (2001, EUR 20066); Role and Strategic 
Use of IPR in International Research Collaborations (2002, EUR 20230); Strategic Use and 
Adaptation of Intellectual Property Rights Systems in Information and Communications 
Technologies-based Research (2003, EUR 20734).
75. Cohen, ‘An Epidemic of Neglect: Neglected Diseases and the Health Burden in Poor 
Countries’, 23 Multinational Monitor, No 6 (2002), available at multinationalmonitor.
org.
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medicine already on the market, it will continue to use all means to 
protect its market.76
We also need to accept that under spending in R&D for diseases 
affecting least developed and developing nations is comparable to the 
problems related to R&D into serious diseases that affect relatively few 
people. To provide incentives for research in medicine for the cure of 
rare diseases, so-called Orphan Drugs Acts were enacted in the US,77 
Europe,78 and a number of other countries. It is questionable though 
whether the solution provided by these acts will provide a stimulus for 
R&D in tropical diseases where those suffering have severely limited 
means to purchase the drugs.
In addition to patent protection, Orphan Drugs Acts offer incentives 
to develop orphan drugs by providing tax benefits, government grants, 
and a period of 7 to 11 years of market exclusivity. This IPR is available 
irrespective of the research input actually required to develop and 
market Orphan Drugs. There is justified criticism that this lack of 
competition increases orphan drug prices unnecessarily.79 
Conversely, an incentive system for R&D in essential medicines for 
least developed and developing countries should result in low prices 
and maximum access to the drugs. It is possible to counterbalance a 
76. Weissmann, ‘Victory and Betrayal The Evergreen Patent System Pharmaceutical 
Company Tactics to Extend Patent Protections’, 23 Multinational Monitor, No 6 (2002), 
available at multinationalmonitor.org.
77. US Orphan Drug Act (January 4, 1983), Public Law 97-414; 21 USC 360ee.
 This special designation of “orphan drug” is granted if the disease in the population 
affects less than 200 000 people (approximately 0.1%) or if no profits cannot reasonable 
be expected. Benefits include:
 • assistance to design research protocols;
 • tax credits of 50% for clinical research for clinical trials undertaken in the US;
 • seven years of marketing exclusivity following the marketing authorization;
 • funding grants of up to US$ 200.000 for clinical research to support development;
 • penalty for intentionally false statement of orphan status; 
 • process patents granted for biotechnology products;
 • accelerated approvals.
78. Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 1999 on orphan medicinal products, (2000) OJ L18/1.
79.  See the UK House of Commons Health Committee, The Influence of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, Fourth Report of Session 2004-05, Volume I, HC 42-I of 05-04-2005, at 32.
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compulsory licence by means of a geographically limited patent term 
extension certificate for the licensor, provided that it addresses the 
issue of reasonable royalty payment only. Producers of compulsory 
licensed generic drugs are then able to reduce the price of drugs in 
least developed and developing countries further by spreading the 
payment of royalty fees over a longer period of time, even after the 
normal date of patent expiry. In return for a term extension the patent 
holder should be required to plough the proceeds of such a scheme back 
into R&D targeting diseases that affect least developed and developing 
nations most. These specific R&D programmes would then be much 
more identifiable for additional public funding by governments, or 
by aid organisations and charitable institutions. This would make 
them stakeholders in the development, production and marketing of 
essential medicine. Such public-private partnerships should be subject 
to the active policy on technology transfer and open source licensing 
I spoke of. IPR licensing can therefore be used to make sure that any 
new patentable invention that is the result of this research is part of a 
common patent pool to which all stakeholders have guaranteed access. 
On the basis of this jointly held IPR it is also possible to licence on 
the basis of tiered pricing regimes, or not to apply for patent rights in 
developing or least developed nations at all.
Third, patent offices, as keepers of public records, have to fulfil 
their obligation to society at large in making available up-to-date and 
current information to the World Health Organisation and recognised 
aid organisations (like Médecins Sans Frontières) on which medicines 
are patented, where, and for how long. This means that investment 
and technology transfer decisions can be made on locating production 
capacity for generic essential medicine in countries where patent rights 
are not in force. This brings both drugs and knowledge to the people 
in need and decreases the need for long and complex distribution 
channels.
Fourth, local communities in third world countries should be 
made aware of ways to using the IPR system to their advantage. A 
perfect example is the recent agreement80 between six indigenous 
communities, represented by the Association for Nature and Sustainable 
Development (ANDES) and the International Potato Centre (CIP) in Peru. 
The agreement deals with the repatriation, restoration and monitoring 
80. See www.grain.org for details on the agreement.
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of agrobiodiversity of native potatoes and associated community 
knowledge in growing and developing unique potato strains. The 
International Institute for Environment and Development in London and 
the Dutch Government supported this initiative. Its objective is to ensure 
that the genetic resources and knowledge remain under the custody of 
the communities and do not become subject to IPR held by others.81 In 
effect this means the storing and making available of potato genome 
information through databases in an effort to destroy the novelty 
required for patenting genome sequences. The agreement contains 
provisions on the joint conservation and management of the genetic 
resources of native potato, equitable benefit sharing of the benefits 
gained from the use of genetic plant resources for food and agriculture 
and obligations to develop, record and protect indigenous knowledge 
related to these genetic resources. The agreement recognises that 
indigenous people hold a different view of property than westerners 
do, yet it relies on contract and the IPR system to provide a number of 
communities with the common ownership and stewardship of genetic 
resources and indigenous knowledge. 
These are merely four exercises in flexibility that show that even the 
current IPR system can be used as a policy instrument for development. 
Common or joint ownership of IPR -or dare I say a little bit of modern-day 
communism- can go a long way in providing incentives for preservation, 
development and technology transfer.
81. On IPR and investment strategies for agricultural societies see Lele/Lesser/Horstkotte-
Wesseler (eds.), Intellectual Property Rights in Agriculture (2000, Washington, World 
Bank).
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Dedications
Mr. Rector Magnificus, ladies and gentlemen,
I have reached the end of my lecture.
I would like to thank the Institute of European Studies of Macau 
and its partners for the courage in building a bridge from East to West 
by sponsoring this chair for European and International Intellectual 
Property Law at Maastricht University. I thank the Executive Board of 
Maastricht University and the Faculty Board of the Faculty of Law for 
providing the foundations for this bridge. I am grateful to all of you 
for the trust you have all placed in me. I will try to meet your high 
expectations and hope to cross this bridge many times. 
I am particularly grateful to Dr. José de Sales Marques, president of 
the IEEM, for his sound architectural planning, to Mr. Gonçalo Cabral 
and Ms. Maria do Céu Esteves for their initial groundwork, and to Dr. 
Christopher Heath, until recently the head of the Asian Department 
of the Max Planck Institute in Munich, for being my academic travel 
companion and good friend.
I salute and thank my teachers and supervisors, Professors Willem 
Hoyng, Alison Firth and Gerald Dworkin for being critically supportive of 
my early dabblings in intellectual property law and for their continued 
interest in my career and wellbeing. I remain indebted to all at the 
Queen Mary Intellectual Property Research Institute in London. Without 
your friendship and support, my years as a PhD student would have 
been less colourful.
To all my colleagues at the Faculty of Law, I say thank you for being 
welcoming and for supporting me. I look forward to working with you in 
future. Special mention is reserved for Professors René de Groot, Sjef van 
Erp, Gerrit van Maanen, Kid Schwarz, Aalt Willem Heringa, Peter van den 
Bossche and for the Director of the Faculty, Appie Luermans. Working 
with you in academic and administrative pursuits is always a pleasure. 
Your drive and expertise has instilled in me the desire to continuously 
strive for higher standards in education and research. 
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To all speakers at IEEM seminars in Macau and IPR conferences here 
in Maastricht I give my sincere gratitude for sharing knowledge and 
for contributing to a number of fine books. It is only fitting that Mr. 
Bentham Fong, Ms. Beatrice Lam and all staff at IEEM are acknowledged 
with the same gratitude for running such a smooth operation and 
particularly for making speakers and a growing number of Maastricht 
University students feel welcome in Macau. I hope this new bridge will 
serve as an opportunity for students from East and West to appreciate 
IPR, international trade and cultural diversity.
I am heavily indebted to my parents and parents in law for their 
dedication that has always been enabling.
This lecture is dedicated to my beautiful children Elin and Natan, and 
to my wife Renée. Nothing I can ever say describes the unwavering love, 
support and joy that I experience from having you in my life.
Ladies and Gentlemen, I have tried to share with you my fascination 
with intellectual property law and its increasing role in a globalising 
world. Intellectual property law is one of the most dynamic areas of law. 
Domestic, regional and global developments take place at a pace that 
is often dazzling. I remain therefore a student, forever trying to build 
bridges from the known to the unknown. As I continue to learn the art 
of the trade from my colleagues my aim is to contribute some building 
blocks for bridges to be built by others. For now, though, my aspirations 
are not so high. You have been exhausted and deserve refreshments.
Ik heb gezegd.
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